Shrine of Wisdom Magazine 83 (1940)
Plotinus on Providence
Concerning the base actions of souls, as when such as are unjust hurt others that are just; or as when the unjust molest the unjust (unless perhaps some one should assign Providence as the cause of their depravity), is it proper to require of Providence the reason of the deed? Or ought we not rather to refer the cause to the election of the souls themselves? For it is said that souls ought to have their peculiar motions, and in the present world no longer exist as souls alone, but as animals: besides it is not wonderful, since this is the case, that they should possess a life aptly correspondent to their condition: for we must not suppose that because the world was they came hither, but prior to the world, considered as an effect, they reckoned they should shortly, as it were, take care of mundane concerns, become the causes of their support, and govern the fluctuating empire of bodies; in whatever manner these operations take place, whether by presiding they attribute something of themselves to the subjects they command, or by immersion into matter, or in some other way, become thus connected with body, however this may happen, Providence is not to be blamed.
But when any one considers the dominion of Providence by drawing a comparison between the evil and the good, and reflects that the good are poor but the evil rich, and that for the most part the basest of mankind possess more than the necessities of human nature require, and besides this rule over kingdoms and empires with arbitrary sway, what will such a one say? Perhaps he will doubt whether Providence extends as far as to the earth.
But since all things else are constituted according to reason, we have a sufficient testimony that Providence descends to the earth; for animals and plants participate of reason, soul, and life. But it may be said, Providence extends thus far, but does it exercise dominion: however, since the universe is one animal, an assertion of this kind is just as if any one should say that the head and face of a man are constituted by nature, that is, by a supervening seminal reason, but that the other parts of the body arose from fortuitous or necessary causes, and on this account become secondary and inferior; or else proceed from the irrationality of nature. But surely it is neither holy nor pious to allow that even these are not beautifully disposed, and thus to accuse both the Artificer and His work.
It remains therefore that we inquire after what manner all these are rightly administered and preserve an invariable order; or if this is denied, it is proper to explain the mode of their constitution, or rather to show that they are not badly disposed. The supreme parts of every animal, I mean the head and face, are more beautiful than the parts situated in the middle and extreme. With respect to the universal distribution of things men are in the middle and inferior ranks: but in an order more sublime, the celestial regions, with the Gods they contain; and these Gods contain the greatest part of the world, and the heavens themselves confined in circular bounds: but earth is, as it were, the centre of the universe, and ranks among the number of stars.
Many are apt to wonder that man should live unjustly, because they consider him as a being highly venerable in the universe, as if there were nothing more completely wise. But in reality man is only the medium between Gods and brutes, and verges in such a manner to each, that some men become more similar to the divinities, and others to the brutes, while the many preserve an equal condition between both. Those, therefore, who by their depravity approach to the condition of brutes, seize those who exist in the middle ranks, and overpower them with superior force, but the vanquished are in this case better than the conquerors; they are, however, overcome by subordinate natures, so far as they are themselves subordinate, destitute of good, and incapable of resistance.
If, therefore, we suppose that a number of boys well exercised and skilled in corporeal accomplishments, but possessing souls base and uninformed, should in the art of wrestling vanquish those who are equally unexercised in their bodies and souls, should seize their food and strip them of their soft effeminate garments, is there any thing in this case which appears hard, or ridiculous? Can it be shown why it is not right that the legislator should permit such to suffer the just punishments of an ignorant and luxurious life? Since, though previously acquainted with the nature of the gymnasium, through uncultivation and effeminacy, they have so neglected the cultivation of themselves as to become like delicate lambs the prey of voracious wolves.
To such, therefore, who perpetrate evil of this kind, the first punishment which impends is that they become as wolves and unhappy men; and afterwards a punishment is prescribed proportionate to the nature of their offences. For those who become evil are not suffered to die, but always follow a former state of being, such as is agreeable to reason and nature; things inferior, such as are inferior, and things superior, such as are superior: but not after the manner of the gymnasium or wrestling place, where nothing but sport is to be found. For it is necessary after the youths increase in years and stature, and have unskillfully grappled with each other, that they should both be armed and assume more excellent manners than they possessed in the school of wrestling. And now some of these are unarmed, and are consequently conquered by the armed; where indeed it is not necessary that a God Himself should contend for the imbecile, incapable of war. For the law says that safety is to be expected, not from important wishes, but by fortitude in battle. Nor is it fit that those who simply desire support, but that such as cultivate the earth, should collect its fruits; nor that those should be well who neglect the care of health; nor ought it to be a matter of grievous complaint if the evil gather a multiplicity of fruit, through a sedulous attention to agriculture. Besides, it is ridiculous to perform every other thing pertaining to life according to our own peculiar determination, though not in such a manner as may be pleasing to the Divinities, but to require safety alone from the Gods, at the same time neglecting the means by which the Gods order mankind to be preserved. We may likewise add, that death to these is far better than a life of such a kind as the laws of the universe are unwilling should be endured. If, therefore, while things contrary to order and rectitude take place through the perseverance of folly and vice, Divinity should remain silent, and vengeance perpetually sleep, Providence might be accused of negligence, as if It permitted the dominion of depraved natures. But the wicked alone rule with arbitrary sway through the cowardice and indolence of the natures subject to their command; and this is more just than to accuse Providence of neglect.
But it is by no means necessary that Providence should operate in such a manner as to leave us entirely passive, for if Providence is all things, and alone the efficient, It will no longer be Providence; for how can it any longer reward or punish? Since Divinity alone would be everywhere, and all things.
But the truth is that Divinity is indeed present, and inclines Itself to every one, yet not so as to destroy the essence of any thing: but, for example, when It approaches to man, preserves that in him which constitutes his essence: but this is no other than defending vital beings by the immutable laws of Providence, and this preservation consists in acting agreeable to the injunctions of law.
But this law ordains that a good life shall be the portion of the good after death, but to the evil the contrary; but it is impious to suppose that the evil who alone confide in indolent wishes should be constantly guarded by the presence of Divinity: nor is it proper that the Gods, by an intermission of Their own peculiar happy life, should dispense particular employments to the wicked corresponding to their base desires; since it is even improper that good men, leading a life superior to the common condition of humanity, should be employed in the government of subordinate affairs.
The human genus, therefore, is indeed an animal, yet not the most excellent of all things, but obtaining and choosing a middle order, at the same time, by the care of a beneficent Providence, is not sent to be destroyed in this inferior station, but is assiduously recalled to a more exalted state of being, by every means which Divinity employs, for the purpose of giving strength to its virtue and goodness.
Hence it is that the human kind never loses the rational faculty, but participates, though not in the highest degree, of wisdom and intellect, and art and justice, each of which men mutually exercise among themselves; so that those who treat others injuriously, think they act justly; for they judge every one worthy of punishment whom they intentionally injure.
In short, man is as beautiful a work as is possible in his present condition, and is so constituted in the universal series of existence as to enjoy a better portion than every other terrene animal; since no wise and prudent being would blame other animals inferior to man, when he considers how much they confer to the ornament of the earth: for it would surely be ridiculous to detract any thing from the nature of animals because they sometimes devour men; as if it were proper that men should live, in perfect security, a life of soft ease and inglorious sloth. But it is necessary, to the order of the whole, that even savage animals should exist, whose utility is partly self-evident, and is partly brought to light by the future circulations of time; so that nothing either relative to themselves or to man appears to be in vain. But he who blames the disposition of things because many animals are of a wild nature, is alone worthy of laughter; because this is even the province of men; and though many are not obedient to the will of man, but reluctantly obey, we ought not to wonder at their resistance.
But if men are unwillingly evil, neither those who injure others nor those who are injured can be justly accused; indeed if there is a necessity that men should be evil, whether from the celestial motion, or from a certain principle producing in an orderly series all that is consequent, evil must be naturally produced: but if Reason is the Artificer of all things, how can It be excused from acting unjustly?
Perhaps it may be said that the evil are not spontaneously guilty, because the crime itself is not voluntary; but this does not prohibit their acting from themselves, for guilt is the result of their operations, or they could not be guilty if they were not the authors of such actions. If it be said they are evil from necessity, this is not solely to be admitted externally, but because they are guilty from a certain common condition. And with respect to what is said of the celestial motion, we must not allow so much to its influence as if nothing remained in our power; for if all things are produced externally, they must certainly be produced in such a manner as their authors please, on which account, mankind can have no ability of acting contrary to their determinations, and will be no longer impious, if the Gods are the perpetrators of all that is evil and base; though in reality this proceeds from the conduct of mankind themselves. But a principle being once given, consequences will everywhere be connected with their causes: and mankind are the principles of their actions, and are therefore spontaneously moved to whatever is honest and good, which principle is itself spontaneous and free.
But it may be asked whether particulars are not produced from certain physical necessities and consequences, and are, as far as possible, the best? Perhaps not in this manner, but ruling Reason Itself produced all things, and willed them in that order in which they now exist, so as rationally to produce whatever is called evil, being unwilling that all things should be equally good: for as the Artificer in the formation of an animal does not make every part an eye, so neither does Reason fashion every thing a God; but some things it appoints in the order of Gods, and others of a following nature in the ranks of angels, and after these, men and subordinate animals: nor is it on this account to be accused of envy, since it operates as reason possessing an intellectual variety.
But we who repine at the order of things are affected in a manner similar to those who, unskilled in the art of painting, condemn the painter because the colours of his piece are not everywhere equally beautiful and bright; while the painter, in the meantime, has assigned to every part that which is proper and the best. Cities, too, that are well instituted, are not equally disposed in all things: besides, who that is not destitute of understanding, would blame a comedy or a tragedy because all its characters are not heroes, but sometimes a servant, or a clown, with a ruder voice, is introduced, performing his part? But the poem would not be beautiful if the subordinate characters were taken away, since it is complete alone from the combination of the parts.
(To be continued)
But when any one considers the dominion of Providence by drawing a comparison between the evil and the good, and reflects that the good are poor but the evil rich, and that for the most part the basest of mankind possess more than the necessities of human nature require, and besides this rule over kingdoms and empires with arbitrary sway, what will such a one say? Perhaps he will doubt whether Providence extends as far as to the earth.
But since all things else are constituted according to reason, we have a sufficient testimony that Providence descends to the earth; for animals and plants participate of reason, soul, and life. But it may be said, Providence extends thus far, but does it exercise dominion: however, since the universe is one animal, an assertion of this kind is just as if any one should say that the head and face of a man are constituted by nature, that is, by a supervening seminal reason, but that the other parts of the body arose from fortuitous or necessary causes, and on this account become secondary and inferior; or else proceed from the irrationality of nature. But surely it is neither holy nor pious to allow that even these are not beautifully disposed, and thus to accuse both the Artificer and His work.
It remains therefore that we inquire after what manner all these are rightly administered and preserve an invariable order; or if this is denied, it is proper to explain the mode of their constitution, or rather to show that they are not badly disposed. The supreme parts of every animal, I mean the head and face, are more beautiful than the parts situated in the middle and extreme. With respect to the universal distribution of things men are in the middle and inferior ranks: but in an order more sublime, the celestial regions, with the Gods they contain; and these Gods contain the greatest part of the world, and the heavens themselves confined in circular bounds: but earth is, as it were, the centre of the universe, and ranks among the number of stars.
Many are apt to wonder that man should live unjustly, because they consider him as a being highly venerable in the universe, as if there were nothing more completely wise. But in reality man is only the medium between Gods and brutes, and verges in such a manner to each, that some men become more similar to the divinities, and others to the brutes, while the many preserve an equal condition between both. Those, therefore, who by their depravity approach to the condition of brutes, seize those who exist in the middle ranks, and overpower them with superior force, but the vanquished are in this case better than the conquerors; they are, however, overcome by subordinate natures, so far as they are themselves subordinate, destitute of good, and incapable of resistance.
If, therefore, we suppose that a number of boys well exercised and skilled in corporeal accomplishments, but possessing souls base and uninformed, should in the art of wrestling vanquish those who are equally unexercised in their bodies and souls, should seize their food and strip them of their soft effeminate garments, is there any thing in this case which appears hard, or ridiculous? Can it be shown why it is not right that the legislator should permit such to suffer the just punishments of an ignorant and luxurious life? Since, though previously acquainted with the nature of the gymnasium, through uncultivation and effeminacy, they have so neglected the cultivation of themselves as to become like delicate lambs the prey of voracious wolves.
To such, therefore, who perpetrate evil of this kind, the first punishment which impends is that they become as wolves and unhappy men; and afterwards a punishment is prescribed proportionate to the nature of their offences. For those who become evil are not suffered to die, but always follow a former state of being, such as is agreeable to reason and nature; things inferior, such as are inferior, and things superior, such as are superior: but not after the manner of the gymnasium or wrestling place, where nothing but sport is to be found. For it is necessary after the youths increase in years and stature, and have unskillfully grappled with each other, that they should both be armed and assume more excellent manners than they possessed in the school of wrestling. And now some of these are unarmed, and are consequently conquered by the armed; where indeed it is not necessary that a God Himself should contend for the imbecile, incapable of war. For the law says that safety is to be expected, not from important wishes, but by fortitude in battle. Nor is it fit that those who simply desire support, but that such as cultivate the earth, should collect its fruits; nor that those should be well who neglect the care of health; nor ought it to be a matter of grievous complaint if the evil gather a multiplicity of fruit, through a sedulous attention to agriculture. Besides, it is ridiculous to perform every other thing pertaining to life according to our own peculiar determination, though not in such a manner as may be pleasing to the Divinities, but to require safety alone from the Gods, at the same time neglecting the means by which the Gods order mankind to be preserved. We may likewise add, that death to these is far better than a life of such a kind as the laws of the universe are unwilling should be endured. If, therefore, while things contrary to order and rectitude take place through the perseverance of folly and vice, Divinity should remain silent, and vengeance perpetually sleep, Providence might be accused of negligence, as if It permitted the dominion of depraved natures. But the wicked alone rule with arbitrary sway through the cowardice and indolence of the natures subject to their command; and this is more just than to accuse Providence of neglect.
But it is by no means necessary that Providence should operate in such a manner as to leave us entirely passive, for if Providence is all things, and alone the efficient, It will no longer be Providence; for how can it any longer reward or punish? Since Divinity alone would be everywhere, and all things.
But the truth is that Divinity is indeed present, and inclines Itself to every one, yet not so as to destroy the essence of any thing: but, for example, when It approaches to man, preserves that in him which constitutes his essence: but this is no other than defending vital beings by the immutable laws of Providence, and this preservation consists in acting agreeable to the injunctions of law.
But this law ordains that a good life shall be the portion of the good after death, but to the evil the contrary; but it is impious to suppose that the evil who alone confide in indolent wishes should be constantly guarded by the presence of Divinity: nor is it proper that the Gods, by an intermission of Their own peculiar happy life, should dispense particular employments to the wicked corresponding to their base desires; since it is even improper that good men, leading a life superior to the common condition of humanity, should be employed in the government of subordinate affairs.
The human genus, therefore, is indeed an animal, yet not the most excellent of all things, but obtaining and choosing a middle order, at the same time, by the care of a beneficent Providence, is not sent to be destroyed in this inferior station, but is assiduously recalled to a more exalted state of being, by every means which Divinity employs, for the purpose of giving strength to its virtue and goodness.
Hence it is that the human kind never loses the rational faculty, but participates, though not in the highest degree, of wisdom and intellect, and art and justice, each of which men mutually exercise among themselves; so that those who treat others injuriously, think they act justly; for they judge every one worthy of punishment whom they intentionally injure.
In short, man is as beautiful a work as is possible in his present condition, and is so constituted in the universal series of existence as to enjoy a better portion than every other terrene animal; since no wise and prudent being would blame other animals inferior to man, when he considers how much they confer to the ornament of the earth: for it would surely be ridiculous to detract any thing from the nature of animals because they sometimes devour men; as if it were proper that men should live, in perfect security, a life of soft ease and inglorious sloth. But it is necessary, to the order of the whole, that even savage animals should exist, whose utility is partly self-evident, and is partly brought to light by the future circulations of time; so that nothing either relative to themselves or to man appears to be in vain. But he who blames the disposition of things because many animals are of a wild nature, is alone worthy of laughter; because this is even the province of men; and though many are not obedient to the will of man, but reluctantly obey, we ought not to wonder at their resistance.
But if men are unwillingly evil, neither those who injure others nor those who are injured can be justly accused; indeed if there is a necessity that men should be evil, whether from the celestial motion, or from a certain principle producing in an orderly series all that is consequent, evil must be naturally produced: but if Reason is the Artificer of all things, how can It be excused from acting unjustly?
Perhaps it may be said that the evil are not spontaneously guilty, because the crime itself is not voluntary; but this does not prohibit their acting from themselves, for guilt is the result of their operations, or they could not be guilty if they were not the authors of such actions. If it be said they are evil from necessity, this is not solely to be admitted externally, but because they are guilty from a certain common condition. And with respect to what is said of the celestial motion, we must not allow so much to its influence as if nothing remained in our power; for if all things are produced externally, they must certainly be produced in such a manner as their authors please, on which account, mankind can have no ability of acting contrary to their determinations, and will be no longer impious, if the Gods are the perpetrators of all that is evil and base; though in reality this proceeds from the conduct of mankind themselves. But a principle being once given, consequences will everywhere be connected with their causes: and mankind are the principles of their actions, and are therefore spontaneously moved to whatever is honest and good, which principle is itself spontaneous and free.
But it may be asked whether particulars are not produced from certain physical necessities and consequences, and are, as far as possible, the best? Perhaps not in this manner, but ruling Reason Itself produced all things, and willed them in that order in which they now exist, so as rationally to produce whatever is called evil, being unwilling that all things should be equally good: for as the Artificer in the formation of an animal does not make every part an eye, so neither does Reason fashion every thing a God; but some things it appoints in the order of Gods, and others of a following nature in the ranks of angels, and after these, men and subordinate animals: nor is it on this account to be accused of envy, since it operates as reason possessing an intellectual variety.
But we who repine at the order of things are affected in a manner similar to those who, unskilled in the art of painting, condemn the painter because the colours of his piece are not everywhere equally beautiful and bright; while the painter, in the meantime, has assigned to every part that which is proper and the best. Cities, too, that are well instituted, are not equally disposed in all things: besides, who that is not destitute of understanding, would blame a comedy or a tragedy because all its characters are not heroes, but sometimes a servant, or a clown, with a ruder voice, is introduced, performing his part? But the poem would not be beautiful if the subordinate characters were taken away, since it is complete alone from the combination of the parts.
(To be continued)